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Abstract
This research quantifies the various South African lockdown regimes, for the SARS-CoV-2
pandemic, in terms of the basic reproduction number, r0. It further calculates the levels of
immunity required in order for these selfsame lockdown regimes to begin to work. The first,
level-5 lockdown was a valiant attempt to contain the highly infectious, SARS-CoV-2 virus,
based on a limited knowledge. Its basic reproduction number (r0 = 1.93) never came any-
where close to the requirement of being less than unity. Obviously, it could be anticipated
that the same would apply for subsequent, lower levels of lockdown. The basic reproduc-
tion number for the level-4 lockdown was found to be 1.69. The suggestion is therefore
that the level-4 lockdown might have been marginally ‘smarter’ than the ‘harder’, level-5
lockdown, although its basic reproduction number may merely reflect an adjustment by
the public to the new normal, or the ever-present error associated with data sets, in gen-
eral. The pandemic’s basic reproduction number was calculated to be 3.12, in the Swedish
context. The lockdowns therefore served to ensure that the medical system was not over-
whelmed, bought it valuable time to prepare and provided useful data. The lockdowns
nonetheless failed significantly in meeting any objective to curtail the pandemic.
Keywords: Pandemic; SARS-CoV-2; Covid-19; basic reproduction number; threshold; SIR
equations; epidemic; South Africa; Sweden.
1 Introduction
South Africa can be thought of as lucky, in that it obtained reasonably advanced warning of
the impending pandemic, however, it is challenged in the way of its living conditions and basic
hygiene. Many of its citizens live in extremely close proximity to one another and they are in
constant physical contact.
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The official narrative of the South African, SARS-CoV-2 epidemic is that it commenced around
the 1st of March 2020, following the return of a group of seven, infected tourists, from a skiing
holiday in Italy [5]. Multiple sources (e.g. [4] and [7]) subsequently reported that, by the 11th
of March, the number of cases had risen to 13. By the 15th of March, there were already 61
reported cases ([9], [7] and [3]). By the 27th of March, a total of 1170 cases had been recorded
and 1138 of them were still active ([9], [7] and [3]). A cursory inspection of this early data
suggests that the first infection, in actual fact, took place substantially before March, or at very
least, recoveries in early March were not properly reported.
The level-5 lockdown commenced on the 26th of March and ended on the 1st of May. Citi-
zens were prohibited from leaving their residences for any other reason than to purchase food,
electricity, fuel, or other items deemed essential. The rules only allowed foodstuffs and other
essential goods to be sold. Limits on the numbers of customers, in the same shop at the same
time, were also set. Only those employed in supermarkets, medical personnel, emergency
plumbers and their like were allowed to continue working. The sale of tobacco and liquor was
also prohibited. Further details of the level-5 lockdown regulations are available at [6]. The
opening weeks of the level-5 lockdown were characterised by migration and a substantial lack
of compliance. This is bourne out by, for example, a plethora of photographs showing traf-
fic jams at Hertzog Bridge, in Aliwal North, and videos showing kilometres-long convoys of
minibuses, at other Eastern Cape borders; all of which appeared on social media. The flagrant
disregard for the rules was not limited to migrant workers and holiday makers. The elite of
at least one establshed institution had guests around, tasted and distributed homemade liquor
among themselves, had workmen in and sent their children to each others’ houses. In many
areas, the large crowds that queued outside supermarkets suggested that people needed time to
adjust to the level-5 rules. People in many of these queues were in physical contact, or very
close to it. By the 1st of May, the day after the level-5 lockdown had ended and the day the
level-4 lockdown commenced, a total of 5951 cases had been recorded and 3453 of those were
still active ([9], [7] and [3]).
The level-4 lockdown commenced on the 1st of May and ended on the 31st day of that same
month. The level-4 rules allowed for exercise in public places, between the hours of 06h00
and 09h00, stipulated that people must wear masks, at all times, in public and a travel ban was
implemented on the 7th of May. Further details of the level-4 lockdown regulations are avail-
able at [6]. This lockdown was characterised by fewer infringements, as the public appeared to
become adjusted to the new normal. By the 31st of May, at the end of the level-4 lockdown, a
total of 32683 cases had been recorded and 15191 of those were still active ([9], [7] and [3]).
Sweden set no special regulations for their SARS-CoV-2 epidemic and their data ([10] and
[8]) therefore serve as a convenient, nonetheless, very approximate control for South Africa’s
lockdown experiments. Sweden’s climate, their population’s way of life, their population-
densities etc. are, of course, all very different to those in South Africa, so one has to exercise
caution in drawing any conclusions from the comparison.
The basic reproduction number, r0, may be defined as the total number of people that an in-
fected member of the population would manage to infect, before recovering, in an otherwise
naive population. Its significance is, however, far greater. In the basic reproduction number
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one has a holistic quantity with which to characterise both the infectiousness of a disease, as
well as the environment in which it propagates, right down to things like the temperature of
nasal passages, the rules of a lockdown and even the level of non-compliance. It allows for
the lockdown-threshold to be calculated, which is the minimum level of immunity the popula-
tion must have in order for the epidemic to downgrade to a mere disease, as well as the level
at which all infection ceases. In one Chinese context, the basic reproduction number for the
SARS-CoV-2 virus was found to be 2.2 [18].
In this research, the basic reproduction number, associated with each lockdown regime, is
calculated from the numbers of active infections and the total tallys of all infections since the
outbreak of the pandemic. The various lockdown-thresholds, as well as the points at which all
infection would cease, are, in turn, calculated from these basic reproduction numbers.
2 Derivation of the Relevant Formulae
Kermack and McKendrick’s SIR equations [17] state that
dS
dt
= −βS(t)I(t) (1)
dI
dt
= βS(t)I(t)− γI(t) (2)
dR
dt
= γI(t),
in which β denotes the rate of potentially infectious encounters to which a member of the
population is exposed, S(t) denotes the susceptible fraction of the population, I(t) denotes
the infected fraction of the population, γ denotes the combined rate of recovery and death,
while R(t) denotes the ‘recovered’ fraction of the population, those that have either acquired
immunity, or died from the disease. The characterisation of an epidemic in terms of a basic
reproduction number, r0, the calculation of r0, the threshold and the point at which an infection
completely burns itself out, are ultimately all based on these equations.
Theorem 1 (Basic Reproduction Number) An epidemic is only possible for r0 > 1.
Proof: By definition, a disease is not an epidemic unless the level of infection increases. From
Equation (2), one observes
dI
dt
> 0 ⇐⇒ βS(t)− γ > 0 ⇐⇒ β
γ
S(t) > 1
Since S(t) ≤ 1 for all t,
dI
dt
> 0⇒ r0 > 1,
in which r0 = βγ , concluding the proof.
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In r0 one therefore has a holistic quantity with which to characterise both the infectiousness of
a disease, as well as the environment in which it propagates, right down to things like the tem-
perature of nasal passages, the rules of a lockdown and even the level of non-compliance. The
so-called r-effective, r0 × S(t), is a characterisation of the disease’s infectiousness, pertinent
to a given point in time, as the epidemic progresses, or where immunity is present.
A Formula With Which to Recover the Basic Reproduction Number From the Data
Using the chain rule,
dI
dS
=
dI
dt
dt
dS
,
then substituting Equations (2) and (1), the expression,
dI
dS
= −1 + γ
βS
= −1 + 1
r0S(t)
,
is obtained. Integrating over S,∫
dI
dS
dS = −S + 1
r0
lnS + c
⇒ I(t) = −S(t) + 1
r0
ln [S(t)] + c, (3)
is obtained, in which c is the unknown constant of integration. At some t = ti,
c = I(ti) + S(ti)− 1
r0
ln [S(ti)] .
Substituting this back into Equation (3),
I(t) = −S(t) + 1
r0
ln
[
S(t)
S(ti)
]
+ I(ti) + S(ti),
is obtained. Evaluating this equation over some time interval [t1, t2] and solving for r0,
r0 =
ln
[
S(t2)
S(t1)
]
[I(t2) + S(t2)− I(t1)− S(t1)] . (4)
Notice that this formula is robust against any movement of I(t) by an additive constant, up or
down. Such movement has no effect on the calculation of r0, whatsoever.
Once r0 has been calculated, S(t2) = S∞, can be recovered from this selfsame equation, by
considering that S∞ is the point at which all infection ceases, i.e. by setting I(t2) = 0, in the
Quantification of Lockdown Regimes 5
above equation. Once the level of infectiousness for a given lockdown has been characterised
in terms of the basic reproduction number, r0, it is instructive to know the level of immunity
at which the lockdown renders the disease no longer an epidemic. The levels to which sus-
ceptability must drop, in order for the relevant lockdown regimes to begin to work, can be
determined by the application of the threshold theorem.
Theorem 2 (The Threshold Theorem) No epidemic occurs when S(t) < 1
r0
.
Proof: By definition, a disease is not an epidemic if the level of infection decreases. From
Equation (2), one observes
dI
dt
< 0 ⇐⇒ βS(t)− γ < 0 ⇐⇒ S(t) < γ
β
.
Since the quantity on the right is immediately recogniseable as 1
r0
, the above statement may be
more concisely expressed as,
dI
dt
< 0 ⇐⇒ S(t) < 1
r0
,
concluding the proof.
In other words, if the susceptable fraction of the population is still above 1
r0
, for a given lock-
down, that lockdown will not serve to curtail the epidemic, only to delay it. In such circum-
stances, the epidemic will only temporarily slow during the lockdown, then resume, as before,
after it. Only at the threshold does r-effective drop to unity.
3 Fitting Curves to the Data
Curves are fitted to a level-5 data set, a level-4 data set and a Swedish data set. Epidemiological
data are usually presented in the format “numbers of current infections” and “total number of
cases”. The present case of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is no exception. If N is the size of
the population, the aforementioned quantities are just I(t)N and [I(t) +R(t)]N , respectively;
always assuming that the population is naive in the case of a novel infection like SARS-CoV-2
(i.e. that R(0) = 0). This standard, epidemiological data format merely implies an additional
step; namely that the values S(t) and I(t), to be used in the formulation (4), must first be calcu-
lated from
S(t) =
N − [I(t) +R(t)]N
N
and I(t) =
I(t)N
N
. (5)
In 2020, population sizes were estimated to be 59 140 502 and 10 089 108 for South Africa
[11] and Sweden [12], respectively.
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The Applicable Temporal Interval
The mean incubation period for the SARS-CoV-2 virus is 5.2 days [18]. The World Health
Organisation (WHO) quotes the incubation period as being anywhere between 2 and 10 days
[14], China’s National Health Commission (NHC) found symptoms to appear anywhere from
10 to 14 days after infection [1], the United States’ Centres for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) found symptoms to appear anywhere from 2 to 14 days after infection [15] and the
Chinese, online DXY.cn quotes the incubation period as being anywhere between 3 to 7 days
after infection; possibly as high as 14 days [13]. Two, record outliers for the incubation period
are 19 days [16] and 27 days [2]. There is therefore considerble agreement on a lower bound
of no less than 2 days and an upper bound of no more than 14 days for the incubation period.
Allowing a further day for diagnosis, data were used from the sixteenthth day after the relevant
lockdown began until the first day after it ended.
3.1 The Level-5 Lockdown
The level-5 lockdown commenced on the 26th of March and ended on the 1st of May. A period
of 15 days was allowed for the viral incubation period and the subsequent diagnosis of an
infection. It was also assumed that the termination of the level-5 lockdown would not reflect in
the data for at least 24 hours. Curves were accordingly fitted to the subset of data ([9], [7] and
[3]) which commenced on the 10th of April and terminated on the 1st of May.
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Figure 1: Level-5, best fits to SARS-CoV-2, infection data (10th of March to the 1st of May,
2020).
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The curves fitted to the data, using Gnuplot, are depicted in Figure 1. The formula for the “total
infections” curve is
1182.86 e0.0523907 t − 57.0624
and the formula for the “active infections” curve is
594.027 e0.0513925 t + 595.899.
The values these formulae yield are provided in Table 1. They are first substituted into Equa-
tions (5), which, in turn, provide the necessary inputs for Equation (4).
3.2 The Level-4 Lockdown
The level-4 lockdown commenced on the 1st of May and ended on the 31st of May. Once again,
a period of 15 days was allowed for the viral incubation period and the subsequent diagnosis
of an infection. Once again, it was also assumed that the termination of the level-4 lockdown
would not reflect in the data for at least 24 hours. Curves were accordingly fitted to the subset
of data ([9], [7] and [3]) which commenced on the 16 of May and terminated on the 1st of June.
The curves fitted to the data, using Gnuplot, are depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Level-4, best fits to SARS-CoV-2, infection data (16th of May to the 1st of June,
2020).
The formula for the “total infections” curve is
5073.89 e0.0580619 t + 1848.01
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and the formula for the “active infections” curve is
426.93 e0.0988331 t + 6020.24.
The values these formulae yield are provided in Table 1. They are first substituted into Equa-
tions (5), which, in turn, provide the necessary inputs for Equation (4).
3.3 Sweden
Visual inspection of the Swedish data revealed a much less prominent, initial step, up. Since
they had no lockdowns, it is fairly safe to assume this would be indicative of discovery, rather
than growth of the actual SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, itself. Sweden’s data ([10] and [8]) are
slightly problemmatic, in that an uncharacteristically large number of recoveries (3069) were
reported on the 4th of May. The synchronicity in these recoveries is highly suspect and mani-
fests itself as a visibly large, step down in the graph of “active infections” (Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Best fits to the Swedish, SARS-CoV-2, infection data, from the 26th of March to the
1st of June, 2020.
One suspects that this ‘saw-tooth’ is, in actual fact, an artefact, which arose due to a delay
in the diagnosis and reporting of recoveries, a suspicion which seems to be corroborated by
[10]. It is strongly suggestive of an incorrect record of “active infections” prior to the day in
question. A decision was therefore made to fit curves to as much data as possible, barring early
March (for fear that it documented discovery, rather than growth). Of course, one has to wonder
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whether the data subsequent to the 3rd of May were not also afflicted by a similar hoarding of
recoveries and, indeed, they seem to be [10]. The ‘saw-tooth’ had the effect of ‘lifting’ the
data slightly, however, the overall slope appeared to be and, indeed, should mostly be correct.
Fortunately, the formula for r0, Equation (4), is robust against any movement of I(t) by an
additive constant, up or down. The r0 calculated according to the formula, Equation (4), does
not change in any way, whatsoever, for such movement of I(t). A corrected curve, obtained by
revising the original fit downward by 1100 infections, is nonetheless provided for the reader’s
benefit, in Figure 3.
The curves fitted to the subset of data ([10] and [8]), which commenced on the 26th of March
and terminated on the 1st of June, are depicted in Figure 3. The curves were fitted using
Gnuplot. The formula for the “total infections” curve is
565497 e0.000908664 t + 577163
and the formula for the “active infections” curve is
4.93594× 106 e7.4265×10−5 t − 4.94259× 106.
The values these formulae yield are provided in Table 1. They are first substituted into Equa-
tions (5), which, in turn, provide the necessary inputs for Equation (4).
4 Results
The results, as well as the inputs from which they were obtained, are provided in Table 1, on
page 10. Note that the number of “active infections” which exceeds the “total infections” for
Sweden, on the 26th March, is not an error. Instead, it is an artefact of the best fit which, in
turn, is thought to be a consequence of hoarding recoveries. As already explained, the formula
for r0, Equation (4), is robust against any movement of I(t) by an additive constant, up or
down. The r0 calculated according to the formula, Equation (4), does not change in any way,
whatsoever, for such movement of I(t).
5 Conclusions
Although the initial attempt to contain the epidemic failed, the sequence of lockdowns provided
vital data to determine their associated basic reproduction numbers and, consequently, at what
levels of immunity these selfsame lockdowns would begin to become effective in the future
(i.e.their associated epidemic-thresholds).
Early data, collected prior to the level-5 lockdown, probably document the trajectory of discov-
ery, rather than they do growth of the actual SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, itself. This conclusion is
based on a discernable step, up, in the graph, coupled with an observation that such phenom-
enal growth would have implied an unrealistic basic reproduction number; one of somewhere
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around 36! At very least, recoveries in the early data were under-reported. A lack of confidence
in the very early data, along with abrupt transitions in lockdown regimes and their consequent
inflection points (delayed, diffuse or otherwise), necessitated that curves only be fitted locally.
The first, level-5 lockdown was a valiant attempt to contain the highly infectious, SARS-CoV-2
virus, based on a limited knowledge. Its basic reproduction number (r0 = 1.93) never came
anywhere close to the requirement of being less than unity. To put this in context, most in-
fluenza epidemics have a substantially lower r0 than this virus has under the conditions of a
level-5 lockdown. Such a level-5 lockdown would only become efficacious in curtailing the
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, were it to be implemented around the 51.8 % susceptability level (Ta-
ble 1, on page 10). In other words, only after 48.2 % of the population has been infected. Under
level-5 lockdown conditions, the SARS-CoV-2 virus would only vanish as a disease, forever,
at around the 22.3 % susceptability level (Table 1, on page 10).
Obviously, it could be anticipated that the basic reproduction number for subsequent, lower
levels of lockdown would also not come anywhere near the requirement of being less than
unity. Indeed, the basic reproduction number for the level-4 lockdown was 1.69 (Table 1, on
page 10). It is nonetheless surprising that this value is not higher than that for the level-5
lockdown. It could reflect an adjustment by the public to the ‘new normal’, the wearing of
masks, the travel ban, or any combination of these. The suggestion is therefore that the level-4
lockdown was ‘smarter’ than the ’harder’ level-5 lockdown, although the data may not be of
sufficient quality to draw such a conclusion. Such a level-4 lockdown would only be efficacious
in curtailing the pandemic, were it to be implemented around the 59.2 % susceptability level
(Table 1, on page 10). In other words, only after 40.8 % of the population has been infected.
Under level-4 lockdown conditions, the SARS-CoV-2 virus would only vanish as a disease,
forever, at around the 31.3 % susceptability level (Table 1, on page 10).
In the Swedish context, the basic reproduction number for the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic was
calculated to be 3.12, although there was a slight problem with a possible error in the Swedish
data (Table 1, on page 10). One also has to exercise caution in drawing conclusions from any
comparison with South Africa. Sweden’s population-densities, their climate, their population’s
way of life, etc. are very different to those in South Africa. One can nonetheless conclude that
the r0 for the SARS-CoV-2 virus is high.
As much as a large proportion of the South African population live cheek by jowl, it is no credit
to them that all lockdowns were characterised by a substantial lack of compliance. When one
considers that similar lockdown regimes in countries like Australia and New Zealand produced
the desired results, South Africans, to a certain extent need to blame themselves, as much as
they do their circumstances, living conditions and government. The lockdowns served to ensure
that the medical system was not overwhelmed, bought it valuable time to prepare and provided
useful data. The lockdowns nonetheless failed significantly in meeting any objective to curtail
the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.
Despondence in the case of the SARS-CoV-2 virus can be tempered, to a limited extent, by con-
templating the ’flattening of the curve’ in the context of the Small-Epidemic Theorem. Severely
reducing the infected fraction of the population just above the threshold might, possibly alter
12 Childs
the outcome.
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